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RHETORIC VERSUS REALITY: THE JURISDICTION OF
RAPE, THE INDIAN CHILD WELFARE ACT, AND THE
STRUGGLE FOR TRIBAL SELF-DETERMINATION
ABSTRACT
This note examines the rape crisis affecting Native American
women today and the jurisdictional issues that affect how and whether
tribes may prosecute and punish rapists. This note also examines the
efficacy of the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) in preventing in-
appropriate removal of Native children from their tribal environment.
A comparison of these two subjects reveals that, although tribes are
theoretically experiencing an era of tribal "self-determination,"
federal Indian law and policy, both old and new, continue to prevent
tribes from achieving health and independence. Ultimately, the note
concludes that a true solution to the problems affecting tribes can
arise only from tailoring legal solutions to the individual tribes them-
selves, rather than relying on blanket federal policies that fail to
consider the diversity of tribal cultures and conditions.
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INTRODUCTION
Since the late 1960s, with President Lyndon Johnson's affirma-
tion of tribal "'freedom of choice and self-determination,"" federal
Indian policy has been, at least nominally, exactly that: a policy of
1. STEPHEN L. PEvAR, THE RIGHTS OF INDIANS AND TRIBES 12 (Eve Cary ed., S. Ill.
Univ. 3d ed. 2002) (1983).
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tribal self-determination. How one defines the concept of self-deter-
mination is somewhat tricky. On the simplest level, one might look
to the Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act of
1975,2 under which "[tlribes assumed greater control over how their
federal resources could be used" and which permitted tribes to de-
velop their own social, educational, and governmental departments
and offices.' Historians note, however, that the concept of self-deter-
mination can take on more murky meanings, especially when repeat-
edly used in more general, rhetorical senses.4 Indeed, some politicians
might see self-determination as a "magical incantation"5 that can
distance them from the paternalistic era of the past, when Justice
Marshall considered tribes' relationship to the federal government
as "that of a ward to his guardian."6
Regardless of how one pinpoints self-determination, historians
and scholars generally recognize that the current era of federal
Indian policy is one in which the federal government is presumably
acting in favor of tribal sovereignty and independence.7 The Indian
Self-Determination Act Amendments of 1994 established that the
purpose of the Act was for "tribal Self-Governance," clearly a step
beyond the intent of the original Act.' In 2006, President Bush an-
nounced that November would be National Native American Indian
Heritage Month and that the U.S. government "will continue to work
on a government-to-government basis with tribal governments, [and]
honor the principles of tribal sovereignty and the right to self-deter-
mination."9 Given the bandying about of terms like "self-determina-
tion" and "self-governance," it might be easy to assume that tribes
truly have reached an apex of independence and self-sufficiency.
This assumption can quickly prove erroneous, however, considering
some of the headier social issues afflicting tribes today; issues like
rape. One may also come to question the idea that the government
is focused on tribal self-determination when considering the Indian
Child Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA),1° an act that was designed to
2. 25 U.S.C. §§ 450-458 (2006).
3. Hon. W. Ron Allen, We Are a Sovereign Government, in THE STATE OF THE NATIVE
NATIONS 30, 30-31 (Eric C. Henson et. al. eds., 2008).
4. Samuel R. Cook, What Is Indian Self-Determination?, 3 RED INK 23, 23 (1994).
5. Id.
6. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 19, 21 (1831).
7. PEVAR, supra note 1, at 12.
8. Indian Self-Determination Act Amendments of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-413, 108
Stat. 4250 (amending 25 U.S.C. § 450 (West 1994)).
9. National American Indian Heritage Month 2006, Proclamation No. 8076, 3 C.F.R.
Thl.1 at 158-59 (2007), available at http://edocket.access.gpo.gov/cfr 2007/janqtr/pdf/
3CFR8076.pdf.
10. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1963 (2006).
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protect Indian families and give tribes greater control over the wel-
fare of Indian children,11 but which, arguably, has significantly failed
to achieve its stated goals.12
In terms of issues like rape, the era of tribal self-determination
has done little to improve this problem in Indian communities.
13
Amnesty International published a report in 2007 detailing the rape
crisis amongst Native American tribes and Alaska Natives.14 The
report indicates that one out of three Native women will become a
victim of rape during her lifetime, compared to one out of every five
American women. 5 Additionally, Alaska has the highest rape rate
per capita of any state in the union, with Native women in Anchorage
9.7 times more likely to fall victim to rape than non-native women. 6
These statistics, which are likely not surprising to those familiar with
Indian issues, clearly illustrate the overwhelming problem of rape
within Indian country.
17
Given the degree to which rape is affecting Native communities,
one might wonder what tribes are doing to alleviate the crisis. Tragi-
cally, in terms of prosecuting and punishing sexual predators and
offenders, tribes can do very little, as the federal government has ef-
fectually stripped them of jurisdiction over felonies, including rape. 8
Federal legislation such as the Major Crimes Act of 1885,'9 and the
Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968 have limited the extent to which
tribes can prosecute and punish felonies;" tribes in Public Law 280
(P.L. 280) states are forced to submit to state jurisdiction when it
comes to prosecuting criminal and civil matters.2 Thus every rape
committed on tribal land is subject to either state or federal govern-
ment jurisdiction.22
11. See PEVAR, supra note 1, at 333-34.
12. See Lorie M. Graham, "The Past Never Vanishes": A Contextual Critique of the
Existing Indian Family Doctrine, 23 AM. INDIAN L. REv. 1, 3 (1998).
13. See, e.g., AMNESTY INT'L, MAZE OF INJUSTICE: THE FAILURE TO PROTECT INDIGENOUS
WOMEN FROM SEXUALVIOLENCE IN THE USA iii, 1-2, 7-10 (2007), available at http://www
.amnestyusa.org/document.php?id=ENGAMR510352007&lang-e (reporting on the con-
tinued sexual violence facing indigenous women).
14. Id. at ii-iii.
15. Id. at 2.
16. Id. at 36 (citing rape statistics for Anchorage women from years 2000 and 2003).
17. See Sarah Deer, Toward an Indigenous Jurisprudence of Rape, 14 KAN. J.L. &
PUB. POL'Y 121, 121 (2004).
18. See, e.g., id. at 125-28 (indicating that the passage of certain laws limited tribal
actions on felonies, although none of the laws explicitly divested jurisdiction from tribal
governments).
19. PEVAR, supra note 1, at 144.
20. Deer, supra note 17, at 125-28.
21. PEVAR, supra note 1, at 122, 124; see 18 U.S.C. § 1162 (2006); 25 U.S.C. §§ 1321-
1322 (2006).
22. See Deer, supra note 17, at 122.
2009] 417
418 WILLIAM AND MARY JOURNAL OF WOMEN AND THE LAW [Vol. 15:415
The Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) also raises questions about
the degree to which tribes are experiencing an era of self-determina-
tion.23 In 1978, Congress passed ICWA to address the fact that "one-
third of all Native American children were being separated from their
families and communities and placed in non-Indian adoptive homes,
foster care, and educational institutions by federal, state and private
child welfare authorities."24 ICWA protects the breaking up of Indian
families by giving tribal courts exclusive jurisdiction in Indian child
custody cases, provided that the child in question lives on the reser-
vation.25 ICWA also establishes specific hierarchies of preferred adop-
tive and foster care placement for Indian children, placing them first
with family or tribal members.26 These protective measures are de-
signed to remedy the placement of Indian children outside of their
familial and cultural surroundings."
ICWA does, however, provide states and courts with a fair
amount of discretion in their implementation of the statute.28 Indian
children not living on tribal land can have custody proceedings trans-
ferred to tribal court if either the child's parents or tribe petitions the
court to do so, and the state is obligated to transfer the case unless
it has "good cause" not to do so.29 The "good cause" standard gives
states significant discretion when determining which venue is appro-
priate for an Indian child custody case.3° Another area of wide state
court discretion is in the "'existing Indian family' doctrine," which
allows courts to bypass ICWA standards when the Indian child's
parents have failed to maintain close ties with their tribe or tribes.31
Evidence indicates that this wide discretion allowed to state courts
under ICWA has resulted in ICWA's failure to protect and maintain
Indian children and families, and in fact may have allowed govern-
mental interference in Indian family life to continue.32
23. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1963 (2006).
24. Graham, supra note 12, at 2. See 25 U.S.C. § 1901(4)-(5).
25. 25 U.S.C. § 1911(a).
26. § 1915(a)-(b).
27. See PEVAR, supra note 1, at 333-34.
28. Id. at 346-47.
29. 25 U.S.C. § 1911(b).
30. PEVAR, supra note 1, at 346.
31. Id. at 345.
32. See GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, REPORT TO CONGRESSIONAL REQUESTERS,
GAO-05-290, INDIAN CHILD WELFARE ACT: EXISTING INFORMATION ON IMPLEMENTATION
ISSUES COULD BE USED TO TARGET GUIDANCE AND ASSISTANCE TO STATES 33-38, 44-46
(2005), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05290.pdf (reporting that, under the
ICWA, Indian children spent comparatively more time in foster care than non-Indian
children, were less likely to be adopted out of foster care, and more likely to be transferred
to other agencies); Graham, supra note 12, at 3 (stating that "recent studies suggest that
one-fifth of all Native American children 'are still being placed outside of their natural
tribal and family environments."').
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Although the legal and social issues involved in the rape crisis
afflicting Native women and the government's lackluster or failing
protection of Indian families seem quite different, a comparison of
these two sets of issues is quite revealing. Despite politicians' claim
that Indian tribes are now living in an era of tribal self-determina-
tion, a study of the rape crisis among Indian women and the contin-
ued floundering of Indian families indicates that this is not so. The
American government has, through some of the very statutes that
claimed to ensure tribal self-determination, denied Indians signifi-
cant control over Native women's bodies and spirits, as well as the
structure and stability of Native families. 3 This note argues that
Indian tribes cannot truly be self-determinative, independent, and
stable without greater control over both rape prosecutions and the
structure of their families. In order to demonstrate how current
Indian policy has effectively deprived Indian tribes of self-determi-
nation, Part I of this note analyzes rape jurisdiction under federal
statutes and P. L. 280 as well as the paternalistic effects of those stat-
utes. Part II analyzes ICWA and the efficacy of this statute in pro-
tecting and maintaining Indian families. Finally, Part III discusses
the obstacles inherent in devising a legal solution to these issues and
argues that genuine tribal self-determination and resolution of the
problems posed by the rape crisis and ICWA will result from efforts
made on a micro level, not from blanket federal policies, federal legis-
lation, or generalizations about tribal culture and needs.
I. JURISDICTIONAL PATERNALISM: A STUDY OF RAPE JURISDICTION
UNDER FEDERAL AND STATE SYSTEMS
A. Federal Prosecution of Rape in Indian Country
A fundamental question worth asking before any discussion of
jurisdictional issues in Indian country is: what constitutes Indian
country? Indian country is defined under 18 U.S.C. section 1151,
which "demarcates federal jurisdiction as extending to all lands with-
in Indian reservations as well as" to land in "which the Indian titles
have not been extinguished." 34 Simply stated, "Indian country is all
the land under the supervision of the U.S. government that has been
set aside primarily for the use of Indians."35 Establishing at least a
rough notion of what constitutes Indian country is important, as key
33. See, e.g., AMNESTY INVL, supra note 13, at 5-8; Deer, supra note 17, at 124-28.
34. Kevin K. Washburn, American Indians, Crime, and the Law, 104 MICH. L. REV.
709, 715 (2006) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (2000)).
35. PEVAR, supra note 1, at 21 (emphasis omitted).
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statutes dealing with tribal jurisdictional issues reference this con-
cept.36 The federal government has asserted its influence in Indian
country through both statutes and case law, tracing its ultimate au-
thority to apply laws to Indians from the Commerce Clause, Article I,
section 8, clause 3 of the Constitution. 37 Although this clause states
merely that "Congress shall have Power [t]o... regulate Commerce
with.., the Indian Tribes," 38 Congress has enacted numerous stat-
utes affecting Indian tribes that do not entail interstate commerce.39
One such statute, and one of the most important statutes in examining
federal jurisdiction over rape in Indian country is the Major Crimes
Act (MCA).4" Passed by Congress in 1885, the MCA has since been
amended to encompass a more extensive list of crimes, although the
statute included rape from its inception.4' The text of the MCA states
that Indians who commit certain offenses, including offenses under
Chapter 109A, which involve sexual abuse offenses, are "within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the United States."42 As Sarah Deer notes,
the MCA "did not explicitly divest tribal governments of concurrent
jurisdiction." 4 3 This is indeed true; little doubt exists, though, that the
MCA greatly eroded any sense of tribal sovereignty or independence."
Another important statute that limits tribes' ability to deal ef-
fectively with rape is the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968 (ICRA).45
36. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1153(a) (2000).
37. RONALD B. FLOWERS, CRIMINAL JURISDICTION ALLOCATION IN INDIAN COUNTRY
111 (Hon. Rudolph J. Gerber ed., 1983) (noting that "[tihe United States Government
used this commerce clause as the means for all dealings with Indians, simply for lack of
any other passages in the Constitution that mention Indians in any real sense."); see
LAURENCE ARMAND FRENCH, NATIVE AMERICAN JUSTICE 39-40 (2003); Deer, supra note
17, at 127-28.
38. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1, 3.
39. See, e.g., Deer, supra note 17, at 127 (discussing the Major Crimes Act and the
Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968). Warren Stapleton makes an interesting argument
against the appropriateness of Congress's use of the Commerce Clause in crafting statutes
relating to Indians in his note, Indian Country, Federal Justice: Is the Exercise ofFederal
Jurisdiction Under the Major Crimes Act Constitutional?, 29 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 337, 343-346
(1997). He discusses United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995), where the court refused
to allow the Commerce Clause to be used when there was only a tenuous connection to
interstate commerce and suggested the Major Crimes Act has little "bearing on com-
merce between the tribes and the federal government" and should be unconstitutional.
40. See, e.g., Deer, supra note 17, at 127 (noting that the MCA was one of the first
laws enacted establishing federal jurisdiction of crimes in Indian country); see also
Stapleton, supra note 39, at 337 (stating this statute lists all "Major Crimes ... com-
mitted by Indians in Indian Country" the federal government exercises jurisdiction over).
41. PEVAR, supra note 1, at 144-45.
42. Major Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1153(a) (2000); 18 U.S.C. § 2241-2248 (2000) (naming
Chapter 109A "Sexual Abuse"); see PEVAR, supra note 1, at 144-45.
43. Deer, supra note 17, at 127.
44. 2 CARRIE E. GARROW & SARAH DEER, TRIBAL CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE 47
(Jerry Gardner ed., 2004).
45. Deer, supra note 17, at 127-28 (citing 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-3 (2000)).
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Interestingly, although the purpose of ICRA was to protect the civil
rights of tribal members, Congress focused only on the potential or
actual infringement of those rights by tribal governments and ig-
nored any infringement by the federal government itself.46 The most
important part of ICRA, in terms of the tribes' ability to effectively
handle sexual predators, is section 1302, which limits tribal courts
from sentencing offenders to more than one year in jail or imposing
a fine greater than $5,000."' This clause means that tribes "cannot
respond to sex offenses in the same way as the state and federal sys-
tems" and are limited to merely imposing a slap on the wrist on those
offenders over which they do have jurisdiction." The degree to which
ICRA has rendered tribes impotent to handle rape in particular, and
crime in general, is perhaps one of the reasons why "tribes have never
developed the law enforcement resources to prosecute and punish
serious crimes . . . ." " The United States Supreme Court has also
had a role in limiting tribes' jurisdiction over rape, in particular with
its decision in Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe.5° Chief Justice
Rehnquist's opinion for the majority overwhelmingly emphasized the
degree to which Indian tribes are wholly subordinate to the federal
government. 51 In the concluding paragraph of his opinion, Chief
Justice Rehnquist noted the advances in tribal court systems and
the procedural rights guaranteed to individuals through ICRA, but
he nonetheless determined that "Indian tribes do not have inherent
jurisdiction to try and to punish non-Indians."52 In the context of rape
of Indian women, lack of tribal jurisdiction over non-Indians is partic-
ularly harmful given the fact that eighty-six percent of the rapes are
perpetrated by non-Indian men.53 Before tribal law enforcement offi-
cers can take any action against a perpetrator, they must determine
whether the offender is Indian or non-Indian, 4 a determination that
can clearly be difficult to make. As a result of the jurisdictional con-
fusion and impotency of tribal law enforcement, "it is not uncommon
for non-Indian offenders to commit crimes in Indian country knowing
that there will be little, if any, retribution for their crimes."
46. GARROW & DEER, supra note 44, at 206.
47. 25 U.S.C.A. § 1302(7) (West 2008); Deer, supra note 17, at 127-28.
48. Deer, supra note 17, at 128.
49. BRYAN H. WILDENTHAL, NATIVE AMERiCAN SOVEREIGNTY ON TRIAL 72 (2003).
50. See, e.g., Deer, supra note 17, at 128 (citing Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe,
435 U.S. 191 (1978)).
51. Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 192, 197-209.
52. Id. at 211-12.
53. AMNESTY INT'L, supra note 13, at 4.
54. INT L ASS'N OF CHIEFS OF POLICE, IMPROVING SAFETY IN INDIAN COUNTRY:
RECOMMENDATIONS FROM THE IACP 2001 SUMMIT 7 (2001), http://www.theiacp.org/
LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=oxUoc9WADM%3D&tabid=304.
55. Id.
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The problems that tribes face in handling rape because ofjurisdic-
tional issues are only compounded by the ineffectiveness of the federal
authorities in dealing with this issue. The FBI handles investigations
of rape (and all other crimes under the MCA) in Indian country in
conjunction with the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA).5" Unfortunately,
because the FBI has investigative responsibilities in so many other
areas, "Indian country crimes rarely rank high among the FBI's pri-
orities." 57 Federal prosecutors also have trouble prioritizing Indian
country cases, particularly because of their lack of accountability to
tribes, the paltry media attention to crimes committed on Indian
territory, and their lack of involvement or participation in the tribal
community.5" Tragically, "criminal justice in Indian Country is occa-
sionally pursued aggressively and is sometime [sic] ignored, making
criminal justice a haphazard event at best for Indian tribes." 59 Even
under the jurisdiction of a devoted federal prosecutor, the response
to rape might still seem insufficient, as the high rate of rape and the
small number of federal officials allocated to each tribe make it dif-
ficult to respond to each case.' The failure of federal prosecutors
to respond to crimes, even serious crimes like rape, in an adequate
manner, and the tribe's inability to handle cases on its own, leads
to frustration among tribal prosecutors.6
The inadequate response to crime on the part of the federal
authorities may also have something to do with a deeply-rooted lack
of trust and broken lines of communication between those authorities
and the tribes they serve." Kevin Washburn describes the concept
of the "cavalry effect," stating that "the federal prosecutor in Indian
country is, in some respects, the direct lineal descendant of the blue-
coated, sword-wielding cavalry officer; the prosecutor represents the
very same federal government that committed cruel and violent acts
against Indian tribes for more than a century."63 Little wonder, then,
56. Washburn, supra note 34, at 718-19.
57. Id. at 718.
58. Id. at 733.
59. Id. at 734.
60. See Laura Sullivan, Rape Cases on Indian Lands go Uninvestigated, NPR, Jul. 25,
2007, available at http'//www.npr.org/templatesstory/story.php?storyld=12203114&sc=
emaf (describing conversation with former BIA official, Dough Wilkinson, who revealed
that he was overwhelmed and could not keep up with the number of rape calls received
each week).
61. Laura Sullivan, Legal Hurdles Stall Rape Cases on Native Land, NPR, Jul. 26,
2007, available at http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld=12260610 (inter-
viewing tribal prosecutor, David Hall, who stated that he is irritated and angered that
he is "not allowed to prosecute felonies that occur on tribal land.").
62. THE HARV. PROJ. ON AM. INDIAN ECON. DEv., THE STATE OF THE NATIVE NATIONS,
supra note 3, at 1, 266-67 [hereinafter THE HARV. PROJ.].
63. Washburn, supra note 34, at 736.
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if Native rape victims, already in a state of vulnerability, might not
want to trust an individual whose role carries so much cultural and
historical baggage.' This lack of trust would also explain why victims
might hesitate to even report being raped, especially if neither the
FBI nor the federal prosecutor can guarantee any sort of protection
from retaliation.65 Hesitance to report a rape may also stem from an
understanding among Native women that the authorities will respond
insensitively or inappropriately."
Additionally, tribal and federal authorities may not have open
lines of communication or a stable enough relationship to adequately
work together on cases. 7 Tribal authorities may be displeased with
the ineffectiveness of the federal authority's efforts to handle crime,
and the federal authority may be dissatisfied with the tribe's handling
of the case before they passed it on to the government.68 As stated in
a guidebook published by the Urban Institute and the Department
of Justice:
the realities of federal and state prosecutorial priorities normally
do not give a high priority to prosecuting reservation crimes. The
sense of helplessness and frustration engendered by the jurisdic-
tional confusion that exists in present-day Indian country results
in many crimes going unreported.... Tribes often find it difficult
to secure the cooperation of neighboring state and local law en-
forcement authorities. The same situation often also applies to fed-
eral law enforcement agencies in addressing reservation crime.69
Clearly, then, the interaction between tribal, state, and federal author-
ities gives rise to frustration on the part of all involved.
Given tribes' lack of substantive jurisdiction over rape and their
dependence on the federal government, it is hard to argue that tribes
can act self-determinatively when it comes to this crisis. Rather,
one can view the current system of rape jurisdiction as a holdover
policy from the prime era of paternalistic federal Indian policy in the
64. Id.
65. Id. at 738.
66. See Lisa Bhungalia, Native American Women and Violence, NAT'L Now TIMES,
Spring 2001, at 1, available at http://www.now.org/nnt/spring-2001/nativeamerican.html
?printable (noting that "[a]s women of color, Native Americans experience not only sexual
violence, but also institutionalized racism.').
67. THE HARV. PROJ., supra note 62, at 267 (asserting that poor communication and
lack of trust leads to uneven law enforcement).
68. Id. at 266-267.
69. Eileen Luna, Special Issues for Evaluating Projects on Indian Tribal Lands, in
EVALUATION GUIDEBOOK: FOR PROJECTS FUNDED BY S.T.O.P. FORMULA GRANTS UNDER
THE VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN ACT (1997), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/BJA/
evaluation/guide/documents/stop 10- 15.html.
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nineteenth-century." President Andrew Jackson's attitude towards
tribes, the attitude that governed his decision to remove Indians to
the west of the Mississippi River and out of the way of white settlers,
exemplifies this concept of paternalism.71 As historian Francis Paul
Prucha stated, "paternalism could be either benevolent or oppres-
sive. Parents tended to see it as benevolent; children often viewed the
same actions as unduly restrictive. Since children were defenseless,
they required assistance and support, and since children were not
fully responsible, they required guidance." 72 Preventing tribes from
pursuing, prosecuting, and sentencing rapists, and allowing that
power to remain in the hands of an external entity, the federal gov-
ernment, suggests that tribes are defenseless when it comes to rape
and are in need of guidance regarding how to handle such a crisis.73
Yet scholars indicate that this patronizing attitude toward tribes
stems not from reality about tribes' inability to handle their own
affairs,74 but more from a long history of policies that effectively made
tribes dependent on the federal government.75 The concept of over-
looking tribal authority and relying almost solely on federal author-
ity, when it comes to dealing with rape, sounds eerily like something
dreamed up in the nineteenth-century when there was concern about
the Indians "languishing under the decay of their own government,"
with "no courts to appeal to, and no resort when they are wronged
excepting to fight."76 The current system of federal jurisdiction over
rape leaves little room for tribes to assert their own laws and means
of remedying the rape crisis." Tribes, as a result, are prevented from
addressing their members' needs through their own legal and puni-
tive channels.7"
70. See FRANCIS PAUL PRuCHA, THE INDIANS IN AMERICAN SOCIETY 1-27 (1985)
(describing the historical paternalistic view that Indians are an inferior race who, for
their general well-being and safety, must rely on, and be regulated by, the United States
government).
71. FRANCIS PAULPRUCHA, INDIAN POLICYIN THE UNITED STATES 138-39,144-47 (1981).
72. PRUCHA, supra note 70, at 11.
73. See Washburn, supra note 34, at 738.
74. See Jeffrey Ian Ross & Larry Gould, Integrating the Past, Present, and Future,
in NATIVE AMERICANS AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 241 (Jeffrey Ian Ross & Larry
Gould eds., 2006) (asserting that "Native Americans have proven, time and time again, that
they are fully capable of handling their own criminal justice issues in their own way...').
75. THE HARV. PROJ., supra note 62, at 23 (stating that "the Indians on the reserva-
tions became almost completely dependent, a dependency that paradoxically was inten-
sified by the very programs and policies that the paternalistic government of the United
States instituted to assist the dependent Indians" and that "i]n many instances, prolonged
federal paternalism has resulted in underdeveloped institutions and in tribal leadership
that is ill-prepared to lead fully sovereign communities.").
76. James B. Thayer, Report of the Law Committee, in AMERICANIZING THE AMERICAN
INDIANS 179 (Francis Paul Prucha ed., 1973).
77. Deer, supra note 17, at 122, 125-28.
78. Id. at 122, 127-29, 136, 142-43.
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B. Rape Prosecution in P.L. 280 States
Although the federal government has jurisdiction over the rape
of Native Americans in most states, Indian tribes in some states fall
under the state's jurisdiction when dealing with rape.79 An explanation
of why this is so necessarily entails an explanation of the "termina-
tion era" in federal Indian policy."' The so-called "termination era" in-
volved a renewed focus on forcing Indians to assimilate into American
society so they would become less dependent on the federal govern-
ment."' Driven by desires to save federal funds spent on Indian pro-
grams and "set the Indians free"8 from the control of and dependence
on the federal government, the severing of the connection between
tribes and federal programs actually proved detrimental to tribes.8 3
Prucha notes that "Indian leaders and Indian organizations... de-
manded a continuation of the paternal role of the federal government
in their lives. They were not yet ready to operate without the federal
support systems." ' In the process of "terminating" the connection be-
tween the federal government and tribes, Congress enacted P.L. 280
in 1953.8" One of the most important effects of P.L. 280 is that it gave
specified states criminal jurisdiction over tribes.8 6 The states speci-
fied by statute to have criminal jurisdiction are Alaska, California,
Minnesota, Nebraska, Oregon and Wisconsin, also known as "man-
datory states." 7 All other states are known as "option" states, and
have the option of adopting P.L. 280, but as of an amendment of the
statute in 1968, must obtain tribal consent before doing so.88
The practical effects of P.L. 280 are generally negative and per-
haps even worsen the jurisdictional and legal issues perpetuating the
rape crisis in Indian country. 9 In passing P.L. 280, Congress intended,
in part, to ameliorate some of the crime problems on reservations ex-
acerbated by ineffectual federal law enforcement, but in discussing
79. PEVAR, supra note 1, at 11.
80. Id. at 122 (stating "the years between 1953 and 1968 are known as the 'termi-
nation era."').
81. PEVAR, supra note 1, at 11.
82. Id.
83. Id.; see NATIVE AMERICAN TESTIMONY: A CHRONICLE OFINDIAN-WHITE RELATIONS
FROM PROPHECY TO THE PRESENT, 1492-2000, 337 (Peter Nabokov ed., 1999).
84. PRUCHA, supra note 70, at 71.
85. PEVAR, supra note 1, at 122.
86. Id. at 122-24.
87. Id. at 123; Vanessa J. Jimdnez & Soo C. Song, Concurrent Tribal and State
Jurisdiction Under Public Law 280, 47 AM. U. L. REV. 1627, 1632, 1634 (1998) (noting
that, although it applies only to six states, P.L. 280 has a significant impact because of
the number of Indians and tribes inhabiting those six particular states).
88. PEVAR, supra note 1, at 123, 126.
89. Jimdnez & Song, supra note 87, at 1636-38.
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the purpose of the law Congress focused primarily on the inadequacy
of tribal law enforcement and essentially ignored the federal govern-
ment's role.9° By failing to acknowledge the complex reasons behind
the high crime rate on reservations,9 and simply replacing federal
jurisdiction over crime with state jurisdiction, Congress only suc-
ceeded in creating a system in which tribes are still dependent on
an external authority and often receive unenthusiastic and under-
funded law enforcement aid.9 Clearly, then, the prevalence of un-
investigated, unprosecuted rape in Indian country under federal
jurisdiction was not lessened with the passage of jurisdiction to the
state.9
One can see the disastrous effects of P.L. 280 on the rape crisis
by examining the prevalence of rape among Native women in Alaska.
Alaskan tribes came under P.L. 280 jurisdiction in 1959, when Alaska
officially became a state.94 Alaska has the highest rate of rape of all
the states in the union, and Native women experience the worst of
this crisis, with Indians in Anchorage alone 9.7 times more likely to
be rape victims than non-Indian women.9 Generally, non-Indians
are responsible for seventy percent of violent acts committed against
natives.96 Since the passage of P.L. 280, Alaskan Natives have pro-
tested the effects on their tribal systems of justice.97 They claim that
"the state criminal justice system does not take into consideration
native culture and that rural crime could best be resolved by allowing
the villages to have criminal jurisdiction, but the state of Alaska is
unwilling to give village councils and village courts the authority to
handle local cases themselves." 9 Alaskan Natives may find it even
90. Id. at 1659-60.
91. Deer, supra note 17, at 122-29 (describing federal and tribal issues of enforcement
and jurisdiction).
92. Jim6nez & Song, supra note 87, at 1657, 1691.
93. See AMNESTY INT'L, supra note 13, at 2, 4. Additionally, tribes in P.L. 280 states
lack authority when it comes to certain important legislative endeavors, such as the
establishment of a sexual predator registry as mandated by the Adam Walsh Child
Protection and Safety Act of 2006. Sarah Deer, Widening the Gap, INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY,
http://www.indiancountry.com/archive/28149884.html (last visited Jan. 9, 2009). Under
this act, non-P.L. 280 tribes can function as independent registration jurisdictions and
establish their own sex offender registry. Id. Tribes in P.L. 280 states, however, must
delegate that responsibility to the state. Id. Critics have maintained that state control
over a tribal sex offender registry will only be inefficient and ineffectual and that tribes
would know best how to structure a registry for their community. See Timothy J. Droske,
Comment, The New Battleground for Public Law 280 Jurisdiction: Sex Offender Regis-
tration in Indian Country, 101 Nw. U. L. REV. 897, 915 (2007); Deer, supra.
94. AMNESTY INT'L, supra note 13, at 36.
95. Id.
96. Nella Lee, Scattered Like the Reindeer:Alaska Natives and the Loss of Autonomy,
in NATIVE AMERICANS AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM, supra note 74, at 217, 219.
97. See id. at 220-21.
98. Id.
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harder than other tribal groups to assimilate and accept the exter-
nal jurisdiction of the state because of the degree to which federal
and/or state intrusion is so new to them." Given the fact that the
federal government failed to allocate any funding to P.L. 280 states
for the additional burden of having to tend to tribal criminal cases,"
it is that much harder for Alaska state law enforcement to access the
rural and remote regions where many Native rape victims live.10 1
Because ninety percent of the state is inaccessible by roads, 10 2 state
law enforcement must spend even more funds and expend more time
investigating rape cases, if they exert any effort at all; there is some
indication that "[wihile the State has sought to limit the exercise of
tribal authority and traditional justice methods for keeping the peace
in villages, it has at the same time failed to provide state law enforce-
ment services."10 3 The rape statistics of Alaskan Native women alone
prove just how ineffectual criminal justice enforcement is under the
P.L. 280 jurisdictional system.
Not only is it possible to attribute the paternalistic nature of the
federal jurisdiction over rape to an entrenchment in practices and
laws of an earlier, more distant, less culturally sensitive time, it is
also possible to consider P.L. 280 the product of modern paternalism,
specifically paternalism passed from the federal government to the
state.0 4 No tribe has ever officially consented to P.L. 280,105 and as
stated above, tribes have rejected the law's erosion of existing tribal
judicial systems.1" Some states took liberties with P.L. 280, interpret-
ing it to give them wide latitude over Indian tribes.0 7 Indeed, rather
than helping tribes become more independent and autonomous, P.L.
280 gave states an avenue to become oppressively paternalistic.0 '
The ramifications of this oppressive paternalism are shown by the
suffering of Native women under a jurisdictional system that fails
99. See PEVAR, supra note 1, at 299-300; Lee, supra note 96, at 221 (noting that "many
natives.., are not assimilated into the dominant culture..
100. Jimdnez & Song, supra note 87, at 1657.
101. AMNESTY INT'L, supra note 13, at 36.
102. Karen Shugart, Rape May Be Most Common in Rural Areas, RURAL WOMYN ZONE,
Sept. 21, 2003, http://www.ruralwomyn.net/rape_rural.html.
103. Oversight Hearing on the Prevalence of and Solutions to Stopping Violence Against
Women in Indian Country Before the S. Comm. on Indian Aff., 110th Cong. 5, 6-7 (2007)
(statement of Alexandra Arriaga, Director of Government Relations, Amnesty Interna-
tional USA), available at httpJ/indian.senate.gov/public_filesAlexArriagatestimony.pdf.
104. See, e.g., FRENCH, supra note 37, at 38-40.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 40.
107. Id. at 39-41.
108. Id. at 40; see Ada Pecos Melton & Jerry Gardner, American Indian Dev. Assoc.,
Public Law 280: Issues and Concerns for Victims of Crime in Indian Country, http://www
.aidainc.net/Publications/pl280.htm (last visited Jan. 9, 2009).
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to protect them from becoming victims of rape and provides them, at
best, with ineffectual means of seeking justice: a jurisdictional sys-
tem that seems to only exacerbate the problems experienced under
federal rape jurisdiction.
II. THE INDIAN CHILD WELFARE ACT
A. How ICWA Was Born
As Part I explained, rape jurisdiction for Native Americans is
a creature of several different statutes from different but nonethe-
less paternalistic eras of federal Indian policy. Unlike the system of
rape jurisdiction, the system that dictates the process of removing
Indian children from their homes and influences the structure of
Indian families is a single piece of legislation enacted during the Self-
Determination era, a period of federal Indian policy that presumably
sought, and seeks, to protect and preserve tribal sovereignty. °9 This
piece of legislation is the Indian Child Welfare Act,"0 or ICWA, and
its effects (as Part II will show) have been mixed.
Any analysis of ICWA necessarily requires an understanding of
the circumstances under which the Act was drafted and passed. Prior
to the passage of ICWA, there was a prevailing sense in American
jurisprudence that "[t]he Native American lacked the independence
and drive for achievement perceived as normal and necessary not
only for success, but even for survival.""' This attitude is illustrated
by the fact that, as shown by a 1969 survey of sixteen states, "approx-
imately 85 percent of Native American children" removed from their
homes were placed in non-native environments." 2 This statistic indi-
cates that in most Indian child custody cases, courts found Indian
tribes incapable of, or unsuitable for, raising their own children."3
In light of the high rate of placement of Indian children in non-native
environments, Congress became concerned with the idea that "tribes
could disappear as their next generation was forcibly assimilated
through termination of parental rights of Native Americans and out-
placement of their children.""' 4 A 1975 report made for the American
109. ALVIN M. JOSEPHY JR. ET AL., RED POWER: THE AMERICAN INDIANS' FIGHT FOR
FREEDOM 122 (Alvin M. Josephy Jr. et al. eds., Univ. of Neb., 2d ed. 1999).
110. 25 U.S.C. § 1901-1963 (2006); JOSEPHY, supra note 109, at 122.
111. Jeanne Louise Carriere, Representing the Native American: Culture, Jurisdiction,
and the Indian Child Welfare Act, 79 IOWA L. REV. 585, 592 (1994).
112. B.J. JONES ET AL., THE INDIAN CHILD WELFARE ACT HANDBOOK 4 (Am. Bar Ass'n,
2d ed. 2008).
113. See id. at 2-3.
114. Carriere, supra note 111, at 597-98.
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Academy of Child Psychiatry, noted that regardless of the quality
and supportive nature of the non-Indian foster home, Indian children
placed in such a home would later suffer adjustment and identity
issues due to the separation from their family and culture." 5 The
termination policies adopted in the 1950s had clearly taken a toll on
tribal family structure and Indian children.
It is important to note, however, that the breaking up of Indian
families had been occurring long before the "termination era" of fed-
eral Indian policy.' 6 Congress was dealing with an issue that had
existed beginning in the 1800s, when Indian children were forcibly re-
moved from the tribal environment and placed in white-run board-
ing schools in an attempt at forced cultural assimilation.' 7 Although
there is some evidence that these boarding schools might have pro-
vided Indian children with opportunities and education they might
not have otherwise received, most evidence indicates that the board-
ing school experience taught Indian children that their culture was
inferior and that they must abandon their traditions and heritage."8
Researchers have noted that
through the boarding schools, reformers, educators, and federal
agents waged cultural, psychological, and intellectual warfare on
Native students as part of a concerted effort to turn Indians into
"Americans." School administrators and teachers cut children's
hair; changed their dress, their diets, and their names; introduced
them to unfamiliar conceptions of space and time; and subjected
them to militaristic regimentation and discipline. '19
It seems hard to imagine that the education and opportunities af-
forded Indian children through their placement in these boarding
schools truly outweighed the effects of this so-called warfare.
As the era of the white-run Indian boarding school ended, assimi-
lation was effected by the termination of Indian families through the
removal of Indian children from the home and their adoption into
white households. 2 ° The hearings preceding the passage of ICWA
indicate the inability of state child welfare officials to understand the
115. ICWA Law Ctr., History Behind Enactment of the Indian Child Welfare Act,
http://www.icwlc.org/historyoficwa.html (last visited Jan.9, 2009).
116. See FRENCH, supra note 37, at 39; PEVAR, supra note 1, at 122.
117. Barbara Ann Atwood, Flashpoints Under the Indian Child Welfare Act: Toward
a New Understanding of State Court Resistance, 51 EMORY L.J. 587, 602 (2002).
118. See BEVERLY J. KLUG & PATRICIA T. WHITFIELD, WIDENING THE CIRCLE:
CULTURALLY RELEVANT PEDAGOGY FOR AMERICAN INDIAN CHILDREN 32 (2003).
119. Julie Davis, American Indian Boarding School Experiences: Recent Studies from
Native Perspectives, 15 ORG. AM. HIsTORIAN MAG. HIST. 20, 20 (2001), available at http://
www.oah.org/pubs/magazine/deseg/davis.html.
120. MARILYN IRVIN HOLT, INDIAN ORPHANAGES 253-54 (2001).
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traditions and methods involved in tribal child-rearing, which often
involved the raising of children by non-immediate family members.'21
Scholars have noted that tribal constructions of family differ dra-
matically from Anglo-American constructions of family; although in
Anglo-American families "extended family such as grandparents,
aunts, uncles, and cousins often play a part in the life of a child, their
role is much less central than in most tribal familial relations."122
Native families rely on an entire kinship community composed of non-
nuclear family members for the raising and education of children. 23
In certain tribal cultures, these family members even assume specific
child-rearing responsibilities. 124 Given this information, one might
expect that tribal courts "embrace a more fluid concept of child rear-
ing in which biology and formal adoption are not the only routes to the
obligations and responsibilities of parenthood."'' 25 Through the pre-
ICWA hearings, Congress finally recognized that cultural bias and
a misunderstanding about tribal family structure played a role in
most removals of Indian children from their tribal home.126 Congress
asserted that it had the duty to protect the resources of Indian tribes,
the most important of which is Indian children. 27 Congress further
stated that the purpose of ICWA was to establish minimum standards
for the removal of Indian children from their homes and to attempt to
place whatever children might be removed into tribal or tribe-affiliated
homes. 2 ' Critics have assailed ICWA, with some arguing that the
Act merely perpetuates federal control over what should rightfully be
intra-tribal issues.'29 In order to truly evaluate the effects of ICWA
and its role in determining the structure of Native families, one must
examine certain key provisions of the statute itself.
121. Atwood, supra note 117, at 603; JONES ET. AL., supra note 112, at 3.
122. JONES ET. AL., supra note 112, at 3; 1 JUSTIN B. RICHLAND & SARAH DEER,
INTRODUCTION TO TRIBAL LEGAL STUDIES 192 (Jerry Gardner ed., 2004).
123. Graham, supra note 12, at 6.
124. Id.
125. Barbara Ann Atwood, Tribal Jurisprudence and Cultural Meanings of the Family,
79 NEB. L. REv. 577, 615 (2000).
126. 25 U.S.C. § 1901(5) (2006).
127. § 1901(2), (3).
128. § 1902.
129. See Carriere, supra note 111, at 597-600. Carriere states that:
the Act does not fully commit itself to its task of restraining the majori-
tarian states from destroying Native America, for it refuses to trust Native
Americans in the role that it assigns them. It sidesteps the issue of Native
American empowerment whenever sovereignty appears to pose a potential
stumbling block to the incorporation of the group's individual members into
the Euro-American world. In maintaining this contradiction, the ICWA
recapitulates the inconsistencies of the popular cultural view of the Native
American.
Id. at 598.
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B. Key Provisions of ICWA
Section 1911 of ICWA outlines important jurisdictional stan-
dards that courts must follow when dealing with Indian child cus-
tody proceedings.130 Section 1911(a) states that Indian tribes will have
"jurisdiction exclusive" over child custody proceedings involving
children residing or domiciled on the tribe's reservation. 13' Those
children who are wards of tribal court will remain under the juris-
diction of the tribe no matter where they reside or claim domicile.'32
This provision is mandatory and prohibits state interference with
proceedings that are truly intra-reservation.
133
In terms of Indian children who do not reside on or who are not
domiciled on the tribe's reservation, ICWA requires that the state
court claiming jurisdiction must comply with certain standards.3
The state court claiming jurisdiction, "in the absence of good cause
to the contrary, shall transfer such proceeding to the jurisdiction of
the tribe.., upon the petition of either parent or the Indian custodian
or the Indian child's tribe." 3 ' In addition to this safeguard, section
1912(a) requires that the Indian child's parent/custodian and tribe
be notified of the proceedings and that no termination of parental
rights or removal from the home take place until 10 days after the
notice was received. 136 Theoretically, these rules will allow tribes the
time and notice to address child custody proceedings taking place
outside of tribal court and, if necessary, remove that proceeding to
tribal court.'37
One of the most important provisions of ICWA is found in
section 1915, which addresses the rules and standards applicable to
placement of Indian children. 38 In terms of the adoption of Indian
children, state courts must give preference to the placement of the
children with a member of the child's extended family, a member of
the child's tribe, or another Indian family.'39 The criteria governing
pre-adoptive and foster care placements list similar preferences for
placement; if a member of the child's extended family is unavailable
for placement, the child should be situated in a foster home "licensed,
130. 25 U.S.C. § 1911.
131. § 1911(a).
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. § 1911(b).
135. Id.
136. § 1912(a).
137. See § 1911(c), § 1912(a).
138. § 1915.
139. § 1915(a).
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approved or specified" by the tribe. 4 ° If no such foster home exists,
the child should be placed in an Indian foster home recommended by
a non-Indian authorizing authority or a children's institution autho-
rized or operated by the tribe, provided that it can serve the child's
particular needs.141 In addition to these criteria, this section of ICWA
specifies that the tribe can make a resolution for a different order of
preferences; such a resolution forces the court to follow the tribe's
preferences so long as the proposed placement is the least restrictive
environment for the child and will be able to meet the child's needs.142
It is important to note that with respect to abiding by the preferred
placements listed in section 1915(a) and (b), the state must follow
those criteria for placement only "in the absence of good cause to the
contrary." 143 This exception to the otherwise mandatory placement
preferences allows state courts flexibility in applying ICWA.
C. Effects and Criticism of ICWA
Despite the noble purpose behind the passage of ICWA, namely,
the protection of the best interests of Indian children and the promo-
tion of tribal stability and security, 144 ICWA has come under criti-
cism since its passage. One of the chief criticisms and concerns cited
by legal scholars and social critics is the fact that so many Indian chil-
dren, up to one-fifth, "are still being placed outside of their natural
tribal and family environments"'45 and that "[c]ourts, social welfare
agencies, and attorneys who fail to follow the letter and spirit of the
law have all contributed to this ongoing crisis." " Indeed, the National
Conference of State Legislatures, in discussing ICWA and its effects,
noted that state officials' ignorance of the Act or refusal to comply
with its provisions have detracted from its effectiveness.'47 Clearly,
without proper implementation by the states, the purpose of ICWA
cannot truly be realized.
One of the ways in which states fail to properly implement ICWA
or take liberties with the discretion provided in the Act is through
140. § 1915(b).
141. Id.
142. § 1915(c).
143. § 1915(a), (b).
144. § 1902.
145. Troy R. Johnson, Introduction to THE INDIAN CHILD WELFARE AcT: UNTO THE
SEVENTH GENERATION (Troy R. Johnson ed., 1993).
146. Graham, supra note 12, at 3.
147. Andrea Wilkins, Nat'l Conference of State Legislatures, The Indian Child Welfare
Act and the States, Apr. 2004, http://www.ncsl.org/programsIstatetribe/ICWA.htm.
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the "existing Indian family" doctrine. 148 This doctrine "bars applica-
tion of the ICWA when either the child or the child's parents have
not maintained a significant social, cultural, or political relationship
with his tribe." 149 Many critics of this doctrine claim that it func-
tions merely as a loophole states may use to avoid applying ICWA
in child custody cases and thereby retain jurisdiction. 5 ° The doc-
trine is entirely court-created and was first established in a Kansas
Supreme Court case, In re Adoption of Baby Boy L. 5' In this case,
the child in question was five-sixteenths Kiowa and was born to a
man enrolled in the Kiowa tribe. 52 In order to qualify as a member of
the Kiowa tribe, a child must be at least one-quarter Kiowa; because
of the child's qualification as a tribal member, he also qualified as an
Indian child under ICWA's definition.'53 The Kansas Supreme Court,
however, chose to focus not on the strict letter of ICWA and its defi-
nition of an Indian child."5 Rather, the court found an "underlying
thread that runs throughout the entire Act to the effect that the Act
is concerned with the removal of Indian children from an existing
Indian family unit and the resultant breakup of the Indian family."''
55
This "underlying thread" became the basis for the court not applying
ICWA in the particular case at hand.'56 Ten other states have em-
ployed this doctrine since its inception,'57 although recently states
such as Oklahoma and courts in California have rejected its use.'58
148. Cheyafina L. Jaflhe, The "Existing Indian Family"Exception to the Indian Child
Welfare Act: The States'Attempt to Slaughter Tribal Interests in Indian Children, 66 LA.
L. REv. 733, 741 (2006).
149. Id. at 741-42.
150. Id. at 741.
151. 643 P.2d 168, 175 (Kan. 1982); see Jaffke, supra note 148, at 741.
152. Baby Boy L., 643 P.2d at 172, 176.
153. Id. at 176.
154. Id.; see 25 U.S.C. § 1903(4) (2000) (defining "Indian child" as "any unmarried
person who is under age eighteen and is either (a) a member of an Indian tribe or (b) is
eligible for membership in an Indian tribe and is the biological child of a member of an
Indian tribe").
155. Baby Boy L., 643 P.2d at 175.
156. Id.
157. Marcia Yablon, The Indian Child Welfare Act Amendments of 2003, 38 FAM. L.Q.
689, 701-02 (2004).
158. See In re Vincent M., 59 Cal. Rptr. 3d 321, 334 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007) (explaining
that California had not taken a uniform stance on the doctrine, but that "[a]n unambiguous
federal statute and an unambiguous state statute require the application of the ICWA's
substantive provisions whenever the proceedings involve an Indian child. The plain lan-
guage of these statutes precludes the existence of an exception where there is no existing
Indian family.'); Cherokee Nation v. Nomura, 160 P.3d 967,974-75 (Okla. 2007) (explaining
that the court "determined the Oklahoma Legislature amended the Oklahoma [Indian
Child Welfare] Act in 1994 to abrogate the judicially created 'existing Indian family
exception' to the Federal [Indian Child Welfare] Act in Oklahoma.').
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A concern about how states use this doctrine still exists, though, as
it has not been uniformly rejected; Kansas, the source of the prob-
lem, recently reaffirmed the doctrine's validity.in In re Adoption of
B.G.J.,159 and other states refuse to take a firm stance on the issue,
leaving the door open for future use of the doctrine. 6 °
Critics of the use of the "existing Indian family" exception have
noted that one of the main purposes of Congress's implementation
of ICWA was to counter the jurisdictional abuse of state courts in
Indian child custody cases, abuse that had resulted in so many Indian
children being removed from tribal environments.' 61 By allowing state
courts a loophole through which they can deny tribes jurisdiction,'62
these courts are directly flouting one of the most significant statu-
tory purposes.163 Additionally, critics have noted that the Supreme
Court itself, in analyzing ICWA, felt that state courts had danger-
ously infringed on tribal jurisdictional rights and that "Congress
would not have left the pivotal jurisdictional issue.., to interpreta-
tion by state courts based on state law." '164 The fact that the doctrine
remains a viable avenue for some state courts to follow naturally con-
cerns those who believe in the spirit and letter of ICWA.
159. 111 P.3d 651, 659 (Kan. Ct. App. 2005) (explaining why the court was unable to
officially reject the use of the "existing Indian family" doctrine, the court stated that
"[t]his we cannot do as this court is duty bound to follow Kansas Supreme Court precedent
in the absence of some indication that the court is departing from its previous position."),
affd by 133 P.3d 1, 10 (Kan. 2006).
160. See, e.g., In re Adoption of Kenten H., 725 N.W.2d 548, 556-57 (Neb. 2007)
(acknowledging the debate over the use of the "existing Indian family" doctrine, but
stating that Nebraska's higher courts had never decided the issue and did not need to
do so in this case).
161. See Michael J. Dale, State Court Jurisdiction Under the Indian Child Welfare Act
and the Unstated Best Interest of the Child Test, 27 GONZ. L. REV. 353, 381 (1992).
162. Thomas L. LeClaire, in his testimony before the Senate Indian Affairs Committee,
expressed it convincingly:
the "existing Indian family" doctrine grafts onto ICWA a subjective and
open-ended test that, if anything, will increase the quantum of litigation.
The existing trigger for ICWA - tribal membership or eligibility for tribal
membership - is readily discernible by an inquiry to the relevant tribal
government. In contrast, the "social, cultural, or political affiliation" test
incorporates subjective criteria more likely to create additional litigation,
with attendant delays in the adoptive placement of Indian children, than to
"streamline" adoptive placements.
Testimony of Thomas L. LeClaire Before the S. Comm. on IndianAff., 105th Cong. (1997)
(testimony of Thomas L. LeClaire, Director of the Office of Tribal Justice, Department
of Justice), available at http'J/www.usdoj.gov/archive/otj/CongressionalTestimony/icwa2
.fin.htm.
163. See Jaffke, supra note 148, at 741.
164. Wendy Therese Parnell, Comment, The Existing Indian Family Exception: Denying
Tribal Rights Protected by the Indian Child Welfare Act, 34 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 381, 417-
18 (1997).
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Another concern of ICWA critics relates to an aspect of the stat-
ute itself: the "good cause" exception in sections 1911 and 1915.165 As
stated previously, this exception potentially allows states a significant
amount of discretion when transferring the case to tribal court and
deciding to apply the placement preferences dictated by the statute.16
Courts are bound to transfer the case to tribal jurisdiction upon peti-
tion and must place Indian children with tribal members or in a tribal
environment unless they have "good cause to the contrary."'16 7 State
courts are left to their own devices in determining what constitutes
a "good cause."' 68
The Bureau of Indian Affairs wrote a set of Guidelines for State
Courts that was published a year after the passage of ICWA, which
indicated the BIA's interpretation of various provisions in ICWA, in-
cluding the meaning of "good cause.""6 9 The BIA notes in the intro-
duction, however, that
[pirimary responsibility for interpreting other language used in
the Act... rests with the courts that decide Indian child custody
cases. For example, the legislative history of the Act states explic-
itly that the use of the term "good cause" was designed to provide
state courts with flexibility in determining the disposition of a
placement proceeding involving an Indian child.170
That said, the BIA then goes on to establish criteria for finding good
cause to not transfer the case to tribal court upon a petition to do
so. 171 Some of these criteria are fairly obvious. For example, there
would be good cause to not transfer if the tribe lacks a court.172 The
BIA then goes on to describe other circumstances under which good
cause to not transfer exists: if the child is over 12 years old and ob-
jects to transfer; if the proceedings in state court were already at an
advanced stage upon petition; or if there would be undue hardship
presenting evidence or calling forth witnesses should the case be
transferred to tribal court.173
165. See Christine Metteer, Hard Cases Making Bad Law: The Need for Revision of
the Indian Child Welfare Act, 38 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 419, 470-71 (1998) (stating that
"[t]his vague language has allowed state courts to inconsistently determine both tribal
jurisdiction to determine the placement of Indian children and then make the ultimate
placement decision according to the courts' own view of what is best for an Indian child.").
166. See Jaffke, supra note 148, at 740.
167. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1911(b), 1915(a), (b) (2006).
168. See Jaffke, supra note 148, at 740.
169. Guidelines for State Courts; Indian Child Custody Proceedings, 44 Fed. Reg.
67584 (Nov. 26, 1979).
170. Id.
171. Id. at 67591.
172. Id.
173. Id.
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The BIA also established guidelines for finding good cause to not
follow the placement preferences set out in ICWA.17 4 The BIA lists
three considerations for not following the preferred placement: if the
biological parents or the child request a different placement; if the
child has special physical or emotional needs, as shown by an expert;
or if there are no available families meeting the preference criteria.175
Although these criteria could be helpful to state courts trying to inter-
pret ICWA, it is important to reiterate that the BIA established mere
guidelines, not requirements or imperatives.176 Indeed, "state courts
have taken the view that the Guidelines established by the BIA do
not state the only factors which may constitute good cause to the
contrary and that, in fact, the child's best interests may override a
tribal or family interest.""
How much state discretion in applying and implementing ICWA
plays a role in the effectiveness, or lack thereof, of ICWA is difficult
to determine. A 2005 report from the U.S. Government Accountability
Office indicates that there is a dearth of statistical data on how states
are actually dealing with ICWA.178 The GAO did recommend, how-
ever, that the Department of Health and Human Services, specifically
the Department's Administration for Children and Families, use its
oversight capabilities to better aid states in their implementation of
the Act.179 More oversight is necessary to ensure that states are not
abusing the discretion afforded them by the Act or created by the
states through their loose interpretation of its provisions. Such change
is necessary given that almost 30 years after the passage of ICWA, a
disproportionate number of Indian children are still being removed
from their homes and placed outside of a tribal environment.180
III. FEDERAL INDIFFERENCE, STATE PATERNALISM, AND THE
SEARCH FOR A SOLUTION
As Parts I and II have illustrated, the U.S. and state governments
play dual, intricate roles in dealing with sexual violence and children's
custody issues. The federal government's ineffective control over the
174. Id. at 67594.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 67584. This is apparent by the title of the document, "Guidelines for State
Courts."
177. Roger A. Tellinghuisen, The Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978: A Practical Guide
with [Limited] Commentary, 34 S.D. L. REV. 660, 680 (1989).
178. GOV'T AccoUNTABILITY OFFIcE, supra note 32, at 3 (explaining that data was
forthcoming from only approximately five states).
179. Id. at 59.
180. Graham, supra note 12, at 3.
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rape of Indian women and its delegation of that control to states
governed by P.L. 280, has resulted in providing Native women with
little or no protection from rape or recourse should they become rape
victims.' The federal government's development of ICWA seemed to
mark a new era of respect for tribal sovereignty and tradition; how-
ever, the loopholes that allow states a great deal of discretion in how
and when they apply ICWA has essentially undermined the very
purposes for which Congress created the statute.8 2 As a result, both
Indian women and Indian families continue to be victims of a vicious
cycle of seeming indifference and paternalism on the part of federal
and state governments.
Tribes cannot truly become self-determinative without greater
social progress in terms of rape and child welfare issues, as "'[a]t the
very heart of sovereignty is the power to provide a safe environment
for all citizens and to restore harmony when breakdowns occur.""'1 3
Both the rape crisis in Indian country and the child welfare and cus-
tody problems that spawned ICWA are the result of interactions with
white settlers or colonizers and/or the American government." 4 For
instance, "[s]everal scholars have suggested that sexual violence may
have been extremely rare in indigenous communities in pre-Colonial
times."8 5 This is perhaps because of the status that women enjoyed
in traditional tribal society: "[w]omen served as spiritual, political,
and military leaders, and many societies were matrilineal.... women
and men lived in balance."" Additionally, native societies were much
less aggressive and warlike compared to Anglo-American society, with
only thirty percent of tribes actually engaging in war."8 7 Historians
have argued that white settlers and colonizers used "[p]atriarchal
gender violence ... [to] inscribe hierarchy and domination on the
bodies of the colonized."'88 Likewise, the problems that spawned
ICWA resulted from the government taking Indian children out of
their homes due to a lack of understanding of the culture and/or racist
181. See Deer, supra note 17, at 122, 125-28; AMNESTY INT'L, supra note 13, at 2-10.
182. See Jaffke, supra note 148, at 740-41.
183. Carrie A. Martell & Sarah Deer, Heeding the Voice of Native Women: Toward an
Ethic of Decolonization, 81 N.D. L. REV. 807, 822 (2005) (quoting Stacy L. Leeds, Voices:
Women in the Tribal Judiciary - Tribal Court Stature and the Protection of Women, 13
PERSP. MAG., ABA CoMm. ON WOMEN IN THE PROFESSION 3,3 (2005)).
184. See FRENCH, supra note 37, at 39; PEVAR, supra note 1, at 122; ANDREA SMITH,
CONQUEST: SEXUALVIOLENCE AND AMERICAN INDIAN GENOCIDE 23 (2005) (discussing the
lack of sexual assault prior to colonization and the role white settlers played in introducing
this atrocity to Native Americans); Deer, supra note 17, at 129-134.
185. Deer, supra note 17, at 129.
186. SMITH, supra note 184, at 18.
187. Id. at 19.
188. Id. at 23.
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ideologies.' The fact that a significant number of Indian children
are still taken out of their tribal communities is arguably the result
of the continuation of this misunderstanding of tribal culture as well
as the general refusal to apply the Act correctly.190 The solution to
these problems, then, will not be created by the tribes alone. Rather,
tribes, the federal and state governments, and courts are inextrica-
bly intertwined, for better or worse. The path to finding a solution
to these problems, therefore requires navigation of some of the most
complex legal and socio-political issues in existence today.
A. The Limitations of Relying on Traditional Justice Systems
Scholars have noted the importance of having the structure of
governmental and societal institutions mirror traditional cultural
structures. That is, according to a hypothesis set forth by scholars
Stephen Cornell and Joseph P. Kalt, "a society's formal institutions
would be more effective the closer is the match of those institutions
to the informal institutions that emanate from cultural norms."' 91
When it comes to dealing with the sexual victimization of women,
tribes have virtually no control over how that victimization is handled
or prevented.1 92 When it comes to dealing with child custody cases,
tribes theoretically have more sovereignty and should be able to deal
with those cases through their own tribal institutions, but as was dis-
cussed in Part II, too often state courts work around the provisions
of ICWA to ensure that Indian child custody cases remain with the
state. 93 Clearly, in Indian country neither rape nor child custody is
handled by institutions that mirror informal cultural institutions.
Rather, these issues are dealt with by institutions (state or federal
courts and law enforcement agencies) that do not come close to mir-
roring tribal cultural institutions.9 9
189. 25 U.S.C. § 1901(4)-(5) (2006); Atwood, supra note 117, at 601-03.
190. See Graham, supra note 12, at 3-4.
191. Stephen Cornell & Joseph P. Kalt, Where's the Glue? Institutional and Cultural
Foundations of American Indian Economic Development, 29 J. SoCIo-ECONOMICS 443,
453 (2000).
192. See Deer, supra note 17, at 127-128.
193. Jaffke, supra note 148, at 740-41.
194. Cornell & Kalt, supra note 191, at 453. The authors also note that:
many American Indian tribes have formal systems of government which were
not originally of their own design. Rather, they were presented (mostly in the
1930s) with constitutions and bureaucratic systems by agents of the Federal
Government. With the strengthening of tribal sovereignty over the last 15-
20 years, it could well be that the governmental structures under which
tribes now find themselves operating do not match with underlying cultural
foundations of authority and legitimacy.
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One might conclude, given this hypothesis, that tribes could be-
come more self-determinative if rape and child welfare issues were
dealt with more by traditional tribal institutions of justice and less by
the federal and state governments. Indeed, scholars have noted that
"[i]ndigenous jurisprudence is generally guided by a more holistic
approach to justice than the dominant (Anglo-American) judicial
system."19 Indian law scholar Sarah Deer has suggested that devel-
oping and expanding this holistic approach in modern tribal court
systems could serve to remedy the massive rape problem in Indian
country, as women could turn to their own tribe for help and healing
and would not have to depend on ineffective Anglo-American insti-
tutions.196 In terms of child welfare or custody disputes,
it is not enough to simply solve the immediate dispute existing
between two individuals when there are probably many more
people involved - people who, for the benefit of the community or
tribe, will have to continue to live, work, and relate to each other
as members of the same household, clan, band, or village. 197
The use of traditional dispute resolution techniques and peacemaking
strategies, which take into account the effect of an issue on the entire
community and not just the immediate parties involved, would theo-
retically be quite useful in child custody and welfare disputes as well
as in rape cases.198
It is important to note, though, that this solution is not as simple
or straightforward as it sounds. Too often tribal cultural institutions
are not even the product of tribal tradition and culture; even when
tribes have jurisdiction or power over some aspect of a rape or child
welfare case, that case is not necessarily being dealt with in a tradi-
tional, tribal manner.' This means that in order to become the source
of holistic healing and justice, tribes with more Anglo-American insti-
tutions will have to work to modify those institutions to bring back a
more traditional, tribal structure and approach to justice.2" Although
Deer acknowledges that tribes will have to effect these changes,2"'
she does not expound on what exactly it will take for tribes to develop
195. Martell & Deer, supra note 183, at 816.
196. See Deer, supra note 17, at 123-24, 137-43; Sarah Deer, Sovereignty of the Soul:
Exploring the Intersection of Rape Law Reform and Federal Indian Law, 38 SUFFOLK U.
L. REv. 455, 465 (2005).
197. RICHLAND & DEER, supra note 122, at 313.
198. Id. at 313-14.
199. See Nancy Carol Carter, American Indian Tribal Governments, Law, and Courts,
18 LEGAL REFERENCE SERVICES Q. 7, 14-16 (2000); see Cornell & Kalt, supra note 191,
at 453.
200. Carter, supra note 199, at 14-16.
201. See Martell & Deer, supra note 183, at 816-22.
2009] 439
440 WILLIAM AND MARY JOURNAL OF WOMEN AND THE LAW [Vol. 15:415
more traditional approaches to issues like rape and child welfare
and the degree to which tribes will have to battle against a history
of cultural erosion by the American government.
The reason that so many tribes have Anglo-American systems
of justice, of course, is from interactions with the American govern-
ment. In 1934, the Indian Reorganization Act (IRA) dictated that
tribes could reorganize and strengthen their internal governments
with new constitutions approved by the Secretary of the Interior.2 °2
As a result, tribes adopted primarily Anglo-American legal systems,
some of which have been modified to reflect more traditional tribal
justice systems and some of which have not.20 3 Indeed, "[t]he process
of rebuilding tribal justice systems was slow and is still evolving." 204
The diversity of tribes, tribal history, and the degree to which inter-
actions with the federal government have hampered or affected the
development and welfare of these tribes all play a role in what sort of
tribal justice system the tribe has in place.20 5 Indian courts today fall
into one of three categories: traditional courts; tribal courts or courts
formed under the IRA; or Courts of Indian Offenses, which operate
under BIA guidelines and provisions.20 6 The most prevalent type of
court is the tribal or IRA court system.20 7 This diversity in the type of
justice system in place means that it is impossible to generalize about
the state of tribal justice among Indian tribes. °
Another issue with implementing more traditional tribe court
systems and approaches to justice is the fact that "people in tribal
communities often disagree about the extent to which traditional
norms, structures and practices represent their contemporary beliefs
and way of life." 209 These disagreements about what constitutes tra-
ditional practices are reasonable, given that interaction with white
settlers, termination and assimilation policies, and the general ero-
sion of tribal customs and culture have made it difficult for many
tribes to even know their own customary law.210 Naturally, more in-
sular tribes with less assimilative histories tend to have preserved
their customary law better than more widely dispersed tribes who
202. Carter, supra note 199, at 8.
203. Id. at 8-9, 15.
204. Id. at 15.
205. See id. at 15 (noting that Southwestern Indian tribes retained the most traditional
courts, as those tribes were the least affected by "the massive breakdown of tribal social
and political traditions in the second half of the Nineteenth Century..
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 9.
209. RICHLAND & DEER, supra note 122, at 314.
210. See Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Rethinking Customary Law in Tribal Court Juris-
prudence, 13 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 57, 59-60 (2007).
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have lost most speakers of their tribal language.211 Without an under-
standing of traditional cultural and judicial practices, though, imple-
menting those practices could prove an overwhelming task.212
Additionally, scholars like Pevar have noted that "[f]ew tribes
have the means to adequately fund their court systems, and Congress
has not provided sufficient funding for this purpose." 213 Recently, the
Bureau of Justice Assistance has granted funding to tribes seeking to
promote or enhance their tribal justice systems; however, the pro-
gram dispensed a mere $8 million in 2007 and restricted tribes that
received funding in 2006 or 2007 from reapplying in 2008.214 Studies
indicate that funding from the federal government is key to main-
taining tribal court facilities, training and employing court employees,
and maintaining technology, but despite the importance of funding,
the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights found that a "lack of funding had
hampered the effectiveness of tribal courts for more than 20 years." 215
Although not every tribe's court system suffers from this lack of fund-
ing or seem to be failing to meet the needs of tribe members, 216 it
stands to reason that a general lack of funding might make it difficult
for tribes to revamp their justice systems into something that more
resembles a traditional, cultural system.
Given the difficulty in rediscovering customary law and agreeing
on traditional tribal practices coupled with practical funding issues,
it seems an inadequate solution to rely on tribal courts and justice
systems to make up for the continued federal and state treatment
of tribes indifferently or paternalistically. It is no doubt true that,
ideally, tribes should work to rekindle custom and tradition in their
justice systems so that tribal members can turn to their tribes for
dispute resolution or healing whenever possible. One must keep in
mind, however, that the diversity of tribes in terms of their economic
positions, the state of their justice systems, and the amount of tradi-
tion and culture that they have preserved throughout history greatly
affects how readily they can address rape and ICWA issues with tra-
ditional, cultural approaches.
211. Id. at 59.
212. Id. at 59-61.
213. PEVAR, supra note 1, at 104.
214. Bureau of Just. Assistance, Tribal Courts Assistance Program, FY 2008 Grant
Awards: Overview, http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/BJA/grant/tribal.html (last visited Jan. 9,
2009).
215. U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, A QUIET CRISIS: FEDERAL FUNDING AND UNMET
NEEDS IN INDIAN COUNTRY 79 (2003), available at http://www.usccr.gov/pubs/na0703/
na0731.pdf.
216. See PEVAR, supra note 1, at 104 (noting that "[tihe courts of the Navajo Nation
process over forty-five thousand cases a year and publish decisions in an official reporter.').
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B. Diversity and the Need for Micro-Solutions
It is important to remember when studying the rape crisis in
Indian country and the problems with ICWA that tribes are incredi-
bly diverse. With 562 federally-recognized tribes scattered across
the United States,217 and with each tribe having their own unique
history and interaction with federal and state governments, general-
izing about the tribes of America would result in inaccurate conclu-
sions.218 An overview of the state of modern tribes, which are arguably
even more diverse as tribal members become increasingly scattered
across the country and intermarry, reveals the heterogeneity of tribes
today.219
Although fairly obvious, it is worth noting that not all tribal
members are full-blood Indians or come from tribal backgrounds.22 °
Tribes have different membership requirements, often requiring a
certain blood quantum to enroll with the tribe.22" ' The percent blood
quantum is determined by each individual tribe and can have a pro-
found impact on how homogenous and culturally distinct the tribe
is.22 2 Even determining who a Native American is for the sake of popu-
lation demographics can become complicated. 223 Only one-quarter of
Native Americans live on reservations, 24 meaning that most Indians
are intermingled in society, living in urban areas, intermarrying, and
leading significantly different lives than reservation Indians.225 One
must note, however, that
[u]rban-reservation differences, although obviously important, rep-
resent but one source of diversity among a socially, economically,
politically, linguistically, and culturally plural Native American
population. Tribal distinctions represent an even greater source
of variability .... Each [tribe] has its own government, legal
system, justice system, educational system, and economic, social,
and cultural organization .... These differences are reinforced
217. U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, INDIAN ANCESTRY - ENROLLMENT IN A FEDERALLY
RECOGNIZED TRIBE, http://www.doi.gov/enrollment.html (last visited Jan. 9, 2009).
218. See Carter, supra note 199, at 9.
219. See Russell Thornton, Tribal Membership Requirements and the Demography of
'Old'and 'New'Native Americans, 16 POPULATION RES. & POL. R. 33, 38-40 (1997).
220. Id. at 36.
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. Id. at 35 (explaining that "the decision about which variables to use in defining a
given population is an arbitrary one. The implications of the decision for Native Americans
can be enormous...
224. Id. at 37.
225. Id. at 38-40.
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by geographic distances among tribes and the isolation of many
reservations. Historical patterns of conflict, competition, or co-
operation also remain a legacy that shades contemporary inter-
tribal relations, as does the fact that Indian communities often see
one another as competition for scarce federal funding or federally
regulated resources.22
Clearly, Indian tribes, even modern tribes with years of forced assimi-
lation in their recent past, have remained significantly distinct from
each other.227
The relevance of this recognition of diversity to the discussion of
how to remedy rape and child welfare issues, and thus lead to more
self-determinative tribes, is simply that an understanding of the
heterogeneity of tribes makes it clear that one generalized social or
legislative solution will not suffice. Although many tribes and tribal
members are suffering from the rape crisis and from the misapplica-
tion of ICWA, leading to the further erosion of their autonomy and
infrastructure, each tribe will have to come to terms with those issues
in an individual way. The federal government's rhetoric regarding
tribes has, without fail, been broad, lumping all Native Americans
into one class of people.228 Federal Indian policy has always sought to
deal with all tribes on the same level, whether in forcing assimilation
or termination on all tribes, or later encouraging self-determination.
Having uniform federal policies is, of course, necessary for an efficient
and productive government. The efficacy of those policies, however,
is limited due to how little consideration is given to the needs of the
individual tribes to which those policies are applied.
Scholars who believe that an antidote to the social ills afflicting
Indians today involves tribes returning to some of their traditional,
226. Joane Nagel, The Politics of Ethnic Authenticity: Building Native American
Identities and Communities, in MULTICULLTURALISM IN THE UNITED STATES 115-16 (Peter
Kivisto & Georganne Rundblad eds., 2000).
227. Interesting scholarship has been done on the differences between tribal women.
See Devon A. Mihesuah, Commonality of Difference: American Indian Women and History,
in NATIVES AND ACADEMICS: RESEARCHING AND WRITING ABOUT AMERICAN INDIANS 37-38
(Devon A. Mihesuah ed., 1998) (noting that although tribal women have shared experiences
with genocide, oppression, etc., their tribal differences as well as their relative attachment
to tradition and tribal culture have made them a multi-faceted and extremely diverse
category of the population).
228. See, e.g., Major Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1153(a); Indian Self-Determination Act,
25 U.S.C. § 450(a) (1994) (using general language such as "Indian people" and "Indian
communities" to describe the federal governments' recognition of their obligation to
ensure self-determination for Native American tribes); Indian Child Welfare Act, 25
U.S.C. §§ 1901-1963 (2006); AMNESTY IN'L, supra note 13, at 28, 29 (noting the use of
general language such as "Indian women," "Indian Country," "Native Americans," and
"American Indians" to describe tribes within the larger population no matter who diverse
these groups may be).
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cultural judicial and dispute resolution practices have certainly made
valid points on the importance of rekindling traditional tribal cul-
ture.229 Merely working around the problems created by ineffective
federal legislation and the destructive, racist federal policies of the
past is not enough, however. Furthermore, expecting tribes to develop
a cohesive traditional justice system or source of healing could prove
unrealistic, depending on the tribe.
Because of the enormity of the problem and the degree to which
tribes are still struggling to develop stability and autonomy, the fed-
eral and state governments cannot shirk their duty of working with
tribes to make them more self-determinative. Both federal and state
governments must truly recognize the seriousness of rape and family
issues in Indian country and put teeth into the self-determination
rhetoric. Because tribes are so incredibly diverse and have differing
social and economic needs, rape and family issues affect tribes very
differently. Any changes in legislation or policy have to result from
genuine interaction with tribes and should produce more individual-
ized, unique approaches to addressing these problems. Any blanket
solution or policy that fails to result from an actual dialogue with
tribal members will, necessarily, fail to serve tribes.
CONCLUSION
Despite the terming of the current era of federal Indian policy as
one of self-determination, certain aspects of federal Indian law and
state implementation of that law have in fact rendered tribes as de-
pendent as they were in past paternalistic eras.23° Although the laws
that govern the jurisdictional issues involved when Indian women are
raped stem from an admittedly paternalistic era,231 the law govern-
ing the handling of Indian child custody proceedings was crafted out
of a spirit of stabilizing and empowering Indian families and tribes.232
Interestingly, both sets of laws have contributed to the lack of secu-
rity and autonomy faced by tribes today.
One must remember that the effect of rape does not stop at its
victims; rather, it affects communities as a whole, particularly when
the community is unable to deal with that rape effectively.233 Because
of the intricate and confusing nature of rape jurisdiction under the
various federal laws, tribes have been unable to alleviate the rape
229. See RICHLAND & DEER, supra note 122, at 313-14; Deer, supra note 17, at 137.
230. See Graham, supra note 12, at 4.
231. See, e.g., supra notes 70-75 and text accompanying notes.
232. 25 U.S.C. § 1901 (Supp. II 1978-1979); PEVAR, supra note 1, at 333-34.
233. See Deer, supra note 17, at 122-24, 126-27.
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crisis independently and effectively.2" Given the semi-powerlessness
of tribes over such a fundamental, intimate issue, one must recon-
sider whether we are truly in an era of tribal self-determination and
self-governance. Federal paternalism appears to be alive and well,
and the concept of tribal self-determination seems more precarious
than well-established in federal jurisprudence. The ineffective ways
in which rape is currently being handled in Indian country suggest
that a future of greater self-determination might be necessary to the
protection of Native women.
In addition, Indian families continue to suffer from the failure
of states to properly implement ICWA in child custody proceedings.235
Too often states either fail to abide by the specific provisions of ICWA
or they abuse the discretion that ICWA affords and fail to uphold the
"spirit of the law."236 Although Congress created ICWA in order to
preserve and maintain Indian families and ensure that the best in-
terests of Indian children are being met by state courts and social
authorities, the actual effect of the Act on the placement of Indian
children has been minimal at best.237 Given the ever-present issues
with the rape of Indian women and the failure to protect and preserve
them from this horror, as well as the inefficacy of ICWA in changing
the course of Indian child custody proceedings, it is clear that sub-
stantive changes must be made in federal Indian law for the sake of
the cultural, spiritual, and social survival of tribes.
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